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AbstrAct The paper discusses the significance and role of subnational democracy 
in the context of new European democracies in flux. In a context of fragile 
democratic traditions, the displacement of national sovereignty, and increasing 
civic adverseness to national politics, local forms of representative and direct 
democracy might – in advantageous circumstances – help to re-attach citizens to 
the democratic process. What is more, enhanced civic input into local and regional 
policy-making may enhance local capacities and strengthen forms of local 
cooperation. Subnational democracy might therefore work as a partial antidote 
to problems of European democracies, and in particular in the post-communist 
context. Local forms of democratic interaction have particular significance in 
the new democracies in that legacies of paternalism, hyper-centralized politics, 
socialist legality, and deeply engrained distrust towards politics tend to discourage 
democratic participation. Democracy on the local and regional levels is of a 
particularly intricate nature in that it is dependent on the way it is institutionalized 
and constitutionalized, and thus on legal guarantees of autonomy as well as on 
distinct values of self-government as communicated by constitutions. The paper 
will discuss the promises and problems of subnational democracy, and will 
subsequently briefly explore the constitutional premises of subnational self-
government in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The emerging picture 
shows both an increasing role for subnational self-government and significant 
hurdles to more widespread democracy on the local level.
Keywords Constitutions, East-Central Europe, decentralization,  subnational 
democracy
1  Paul Blokker, Ph.D. is  post-doctoral fellow at the  Department of Sociology, University of 
Trento; e-mail: paulus.blokker@soc.unitn.it
36 PAUL BLOKKER
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2012) 
The paper discusses the significance and role of subnational democracy 
in the context of new European democracies in flux. In a context of fragile 
democratic traditions, the displacement of national sovereignty, and increasing 
civic adverseness to national politics, local forms of representative and direct 
democracy might – in advantageous circumstances – help to re-attach citizens 
to the democratic process.  What is more, enhanced civic input into the local 
and regional policy-making may further local capacities and strengthen 
forms of local cooperation. Subnational democracy might therefore work 
as a partial antidote to efficiency (output legitimation) and legitimacy (input 
legitimation) problems of European democracies. In this, local forms of 
democratic interaction have particular significance in the new democracies 
in that legacies of paternalism, centralized politics, socialist legality, and a 
generalized distrust towards politics have tended to discourage the democratic 
participation. Democracy on the local and regional levels is of a particularly 
intricate nature in that it is dependent on the way political government is 
institutionalized and constitutionalized, and thus on legal guarantees of 
autonomy as well as on distinct values of self-government as communicated 
by constitutions. 
The paper starts with a discussion of the significance of decentralization, 
subnational self-government, as well as civic participation in the European 
context, and the argument will be made that firm constitutional foundations are 
one necessary condition for viable subnational self-government. In a second 
step, the constitutional orders of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland will 
be briefly reviewed, focusing on their definitions of state and entrenchment 
of subnational forms of government and democracy. In the conclusion, it will 
be argued that significant forms of decentralized government and democracy 
have emerged in all three countries, but also that reforms have not been of an 
unambiguous kind and that important tensions and problems persist as a result.
The significance of subnaTional democracy in 
Times of democraTic change
In the post-Second World War period, democracy in Europe referred 
predominantly to representative democracy, firmly situated and organized 
on the national level. Indeed, democratic theory was often explicitly against 
forms of decentralized, and in particular direct or participatory democracy. 
This is particularly evident in the widely influential statement on democracy 
as a competitive elite affaire by Joseph Schumpeter (Loughlin, Hendriks, and 
Lindstrom 2010: 2).
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With the crisis of Keynesianism and the advent of neo-liberal anti-statism 
and evermore influential globalization, however, the relationship between the 
national state and democracy has become a growing object for discussion. It is 
now increasingly argued that local or subnational democracy matters, and can 
in effect play an important role in revitalizing and reinvigorating democratic 
systems. However, while in the neo-liberal dictionary that became dominant in 
the 1980s, local democracy would mostly relate to diminishing the influence of 
the centralized state and enhancing the role of civil society, notably economic 
agents, from the 1990s onwards, it was now also increasingly realized ‘that 
political decentralization and local autonomy were important elements of 
democracy itself’ (Loughlin, Hendriks, and Lindstrom 2010: 5). Strengthening 
local government and local democracy could thus for a number of reasons be 
seen as potentially enhancing the quality of a democratic state, for instance, 
resulting from the proximity of local politics to the citizens, the higher 
accessibility of local politics to participation, in particular if in the form of direct 
and deliberative forms of democracy (Schiller 2011), and the shorter reaction 
time of local government to policy issues (Bailey and Elliott 2009: 436).
In political-theoretical terms, the local democratic narrative that emphasizes 
the democratic surplus value of local democracy can be understood as a kind 
of amalgam of republican political thought (emphasizing civic virtue, public 
autonomy, and civic engagement), communitarianism (politics close to the 
citizens), as well as ideas of deliberative democracy (politics as based on 
inclusion, deliberation, and consensus-building). It seems undeniable that at 
least in superficial terms this narrative has become increasingly important in 
addressing problems of policy-making in European democracies. One clear 
sign of this is the emphasis on regionalization in European integration and the 
adoption of the European Charter of Local Self-Government (1985).
The increased attention for forms of decentralization, public participation, 
and forms of participatory and direct democracy comes, however, exactly in 
a period in which constitutional democracy is increasingly subject to great 
tensions and transformations. First, there is – in Europe - the evident shift 
in political and constitutional weight towards the European level. In other 
words, the overlap and concentration of a jurisdiction, a territory, and a people 
is increasingly less evident as important decisions and politics regarding a 
variety of political communities are taken outside of those communities. 
Second, in a related way, there is the increasing complexity and arcane streak 
that matters of governance and democratic politics display. Third, there 
is the increasing civic disattachment – in both East and West – vis-à-vis 
representative democratic politics. National political elites and institutions 
are profoundly lacking in civic trust and legitimacy. 
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subnaTional democracy as anTidoTe?
In normative terms, it can be argued that local self-government can provide 
a partial anti-dote to democratic deficits and disengagement in a number of 
ways. First, the strengthening of local democracy will make constitutional 
democracies more pluralistic, in that political power becomes divided and 
diffused on the vertical level, which helps to avoid, on the one hand, the 
political hegemony of central governmental institutions (a salient objective 
in former totalitarian societies), and, on the other, might help recover some 
of the lost grasp of democratic sovereignty on politics. Second, local self-
government makes it easier for citizens to participate in democratic politics 
and governance in a meaningful way than it would be when politics is 
completely centralized. Third, and as is probably most famously argued by 
J.S. Mill, local possibilities for democratic participation might help to foster 
sentiments of public autonomy among the citizenry:
It is necessary, then, that, in addition to the national 
representation, there should be municipal and provisional 
representations; and the two questions which remain to be 
resolved are, how the local representative bodies should be 
constituted, and what should be the extent of their functions. In 
considering these questions, two points require an equal degree 
of our attention: how the local business itself can be best done, 
and how its transaction can be made most instrumental to the 
nourishment of public spirit and the development of intelligence 
(Mill 2004: 512).
Fourth, local self-government might in some instances also be a more effective 
type of government, in that it is more likely to have a capacity of responsiveness, 
in terms of responding to local problems according to local views.
Local self-government is then by many seen as a kind of anti-dote to at 
least some of the problems of modern democratic regimes, not least that of 
civic engagement, but also regarding the increasing complexity of issues 
of governance. It can, however, be argued that local government and local 
democracy are no obvious panacea to democratic and governance problems. 
Stephen Bailey and Mark Elliott have for instance recently argued that 
local government is only likely to deliver the goods when a ‘virtuous 
circle’ is created, that is, a situation in which ‘the obvious importance 
and responsiveness of local government incentivizes the participation of 
individuals in local politics and elections’ (Bailey and Elliott 2009: 436). In other 
words, ‘[a]tempts to strengthen local democracy must, on this view, go hand-
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in-hand with attempts to strengthen local government’. In reality, however, 
many central governments have failed to induce such a virtuous circle ‘within 
which strong local democracy and powerful institutions of local government 
enjoy a symbiotic, mutually constructive relationship’. Rather, governments 
have tended to contribute to a ‘vicious circle’ in which ‘extensive central 
control, the consequent limitations to local power and autonomy and the 
disengagement of individuals and communities are factors that are mutually 
reinforcing’ (Bailey and Elliott 2009: 437).
significance of subnaTional democracy in The 
new democracies
The importance of local government and democracy in the post-totalitarian 
context of Central and Eastern Europe is self-evident. The highly centralized 
systems of communism – indeed coined “democratic centralism” in Leninist 
systems – did not allow for any significant participation or voice by either 
stakeholders or the citizenry at large. What is more, the far-going centralization 
of communist political systems meant that no form of subnational autonomy 
or territorial self-government was allowed for. Not by coincidence the 
discourses of protest of many dissidents movements in the region contained 
a strong dimension of civic participation, decentralization, and local self-
government (see Renwick 2006; Blokker 2011).  
The past communist systems were detrimental to any idea of formal 
subnational self-government2 in at least two ways. First, subnational forms of 
government were always strictly controlled by the central state, and therefore 
merely consisted in institutions for the execution of centrally imposed 
policies, lacking any kind of space for autonomous action in the interest of 
local populations. Second, not only did democratic centralism mean that no 
democratic channels were available for civic participation, but also any kind 
of political pluralism within the communist political institutions was reduced 
as far as possible, in that the state was subjected to the communist party with 
its homogenous program and ideological principles, while alternative voices 
were stifled under the banner of “enemies of the people”. 
In addition, the “socialist legality” that underpinned the political structure of 
communist regimes was based upon “paper constitutions” that did have very 
little to do with the rule-of-law and were rather a fiction or form of symbolism 
2  In the informal reality of “socialist realism”, there were different ways of circumventing central 
control.
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(in a pejorative sense) that displayed a huge discrepancy with the arbitrary 
nature of political-legal reality (cf. Skapska 2011). Rather than contributing 
to social integration and the constitution of political communities, the “paper” 
communist constitutions helped to enhance existing traditions of “us and 
them”, or, in other words, a deep distrust of society against the ruling elites.
The 1970s and 80s, as well as the early 1990s saw a fierce backlash against 
the centralism and political party-monism that had been imposed with 
communism. In particular in the early 1990s, radical steps were undertaken to 
undo the hypercentralization of the past. However, such reforms tended to run 
out of steam fairly quickly, not least due to increased disagreement about the 
exact nature of reforms, but the subnational reform process has continued in a 
more gradual manner in most societies in the post-communist region.
The  consTiTuTionalizaTion of subnaTional 
democracy
This brings us to the process of decentralization, and of institutionalization 
and constitutionalization of subnational democracy in the two decades of 
post-communist transformation. An important question to ask is whether 
the transformation process has significantly contributed to the consolidation 
of vital constitutional democracies, which involve robust dimensions of 
pluralized and decentralized politics and promote active citizenship, or whether 
constitutional democracy has largely remained a fiction (cf. Skapska 2011: 
9)? Any attempt at answering this question will need to take into account the 
foundations of these new democracies, and whether these are conducive or 
not to civic democracy. Indeed, with regard to subnational self-government, 
the assessment of a “virtuous circle” of local government and democracy as 
identified by Bailey and Elliott above needs a holistic view of the place of 
local government and democracy in the wider democratic-constitutional order. 
This means that the problems related to stimulating a virtuous form of local 
democracy ‘can be fully faced up to only if important questions about the legal 
and constitutional role of local government are squarely addressed’ (Bailey 
and Elliott 2009: 437). In other words, the foundations of decentralization and 
devolution are significant and need to be explicit and clear-cut if a virtuous 
type of local government and democracy is to be expected to emerge. 
The rest of the paper will then engage in primis with the constitutional 
premises of subnational-self government and in particular of local democracy, 
in terms of the constitutionalization of subnational government (municipal, 
county, regional) and of forms of representative and direct democracy. The 
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constitutional dimension can itself be broken down into two meta-dimensions 
– an instrumental and a symbolic one. These meta-dimensions can themselves 
be differentiated into a range of functional dimensions of constitutions (see 
Blokker 2010). A primary functional dimension regarding the instrumental 
rationality of constitutions is that of an instrumental, power-ordering  and 
limiting dimension. Here, the function of the constitution is to arrange for the 
mapping and division of political power, in terms of institutional prerogatives 
and competences, and forms of checks and balances. Regarding the local level, 
this largely negative function (in terms of the limitation of political power) 
includes the level of decentralization in terms of division of competences 
and oversight between central, regional, and local levels, as well as fiscal 
autonomy. A further dimension is the formal-participatory dimension which 
arranges for the possibilities of formal-procedural participation by citizens in 
terms of representative institutions on the local and regional levels. 
With regard to the symbolic or sociological rationality of constitutions 
(cf. Skapska 2011), at least two further dimensions are relevant for local 
government and democracy. The first is the normative dimension, which 
relates to the axiological nature or constitutional morality that constitutions 
express. Of importance for local government and democracy are here the 
constitutional inclusion of notions such as subsidiarity, the right to local self-
government and autonomy as foundational values, and the value of direct 
and indirect civic participation. The second is the substantive-participatory 
dimension, which relates to effective forms of civic participation in democratic 
politics in terms of direct and deliberative democracy.
consTiTuTionalizaTion of subnaTional 
democracy in The new democracies3
Ideas of local self-government and local (representative and direct) 
democracy have had a visible impact on the post-1989 constitutional and 
legal orders of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, and while the initial 
radicalism of changes of the early 1990s did not continue in later years of 
transformation, the three democracies analyzed here all display significant 
levels of decentralization. At the same time, though, the constitutional 
and legal developments demonstrate a variegated impact of ideas of local 
democracy and direct forms of democracy. Below I will briefly trace the 
constitutional trajectories of the three new democracies with regard to the 
3 This part is partially based on Blokker 2011.
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overall definition of the state, forms and definitions of decentralization, and 
forms and definitions of subnational democracy. 
The czech republic 
The constitutional state in the Czech Republic can best be defined as a 
predominantly centralized, unitary state, based on a parliamentary-democratic 
system (cf. Illner 2010). However, this does not mean that the local and 
regional levels of government are not important, nor that more direct forms of 
democracy or active citizenship are inexistent or not part of the constitutional 
order. This becomes, for instance, already clear from the symbolic-substantive 
reference to civil society in the preamble of the 1992 Constitution: “a free and 
democratic state based on the respect for human rights and the principles 
of civic society”. However, some have argued that while some forms of 
decentralization and self-government are part and parcel of the Czech system, 
its main logic is that of “state administration” (Bryson 2008). 
Below, I will briefly trace the constitutional contours of both local self-
government and local democracy as these have emerged in the 1990-2010 
period. It will become clear that there is a tensional relation both between 
state-centralistic and decentralized views of the Czech polity as well as 
between representative and direct views of democracy.
constitutional design of local government
The Czech state as it emerges from the 1992 Constitution is a sovereign, 
unitary and democratic state: “The Czech Republic is a sovereign, unitary and 
democratic, law-abiding State, based on respect for the rights and freedoms of 
man and citizen” (art. 1(1)). The constitutional state allows, however, also for 
decentralization at the local and regional levels. The 1992 Czech Constitution 
states in Chapter 1 on “Basic Provisions” that “[t]he autonomy of units of 
territorial self-administration shall be guaranteed” (art. 8), while Chapter 7 on 
“Territorial Self-Administration” stipulates the decentralized, “basic units of 
territorial self-administration” as municipalities, and higher units in the form 
of lands and regions (art. 99). Article 100 states that “communities of citizens, 
inhabiting a particular area … have the right of self-government”, while 
article 101(3) underlines local autonomy in that “[s]elf-governing territorial 
divisions are public-law corporations which may have their own property and 
which operate according to their own budget”.
43THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREMISES OF SUBNATIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2012) 
While the value of subnational self-government and civil society, and related 
institutions, are entrenched in the constitution, significant (political as well as 
social) obstacles to the realization of principles of local self-government seem 
not have been overcome in two decades of transformation, and the centralistic 
nature of the Czech state can only partially be said ‘corrected’ by local and 
regional autonomy. However, at the same time, it would be hard to deny the 
continuing importance of decentralization and ideas of self-governance for 
democratization in the Czech Republic.
Throughout the 1990s, the latter was particularly visible in the form of a 
conflictive debate between Václav Havel (and the Czech left) and Václav 
Klaus (and the Civic Democratic Party or Občanská demokratická strana 
(ODS)) on the role and form of especially the regional level of government. 
Klaus opposed issues of reform and decentralization on grounds of neo-
liberal skepticism towards bureaucracy and intermediary institutions, and 
held off the implementation of article 99 of the Constitution. Eventually, 
though, at the end of the 1990s, significant decentralizing steps and the 
creation of a regional layer were effected, not least due to EU pressure (cf. 
Calda 1999). The constitutional act of 3 December 1997 on the “Creation of 
Higher Territorial Self-Governing Units” changed article 99 into “[t]he Czech 
Republic is subdivided into municipalities, which are the basic territorial 
self-governing units, and into regions, which are the higher territorial self-
governing units”. And indeed, there are indications that the regional level 
has grown in importance since its establishment. Recently, Baun and Marek 
have argued that the “new regions have begun establishing themselves as 
legitimate and important political actors” (425).
The constitutional status of subnational self-government was further 
entrenched by a number of rulings by the Czech Constitutional Court. For 
instance, in 2003 the Constitutional Court ruled that
The guarantee of territorial self-government in the Constitution 
is laconic. Alongside the differentiation of the local and regional 
levels of self-government (Art. 99) territorial self-government 
is conceived as the right of a territorial association of citizens, 
arising from its characteristics and abilities, as the Constitutional 
Court stated in its finding of 19 November 1996, file no. Pl. 
ÚS 1/96 (Collection of Decisions of the Constitutional Court, 
volume 6, p. 375).
The Constitutional Court considers local self-government to be 
an irreplaceable component in the development of democracy. 
Local self-government is an expression of the capability of 
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local bodies, within the bounds provided by law, to regulate 
and govern part of public affairs on their own responsibility and 
in the interest of the local population. (CC 2003/02/05 - Pl. ÚS 
34/02: Territorial Self-Government; emphasis added)
Later in 2003, the constitutional court further underlined the importance of 
fiscal autonomy of regions and municipalities:
According to the starting thesis, on which the concept of self-
government is built, the foundation of a free state is a free 
municipality, then, in terms of regional significance, at a higher 
level of the territorial hierarchy a self-governing society of 
citizens, which, under the Constitution, is a region. With this 
concept of public administration built from the ground up, the 
following postulate must be immanent to self-government, as an 
important element of a democratic state governed on the rule of 
law: that a TSU must have a realistic possibility to handle matters 
and issues of local significance, including those which by their 
nature exceed the regional framework and which it handles in its 
independent jurisdiction, on the basis of free discretion, where 
the will of the people is exercised at the local and regional level 
in the form of representative democracy and only limited in its 
specific expression by answerability to the voter and on the basis 
of a statutory and constitutional framework (Art. 101 par. 4 of the 
Constitution). Thus, territorial self-governing units representing 
the territorial society of citizens must have – through autonomous 
decision-making by their representative bodies – the ability 
to freely choose how they will manage the financial resources 
available to them for performing the work of self-government. 
It is this management of one’s own property independently, on 
one’s own account and own responsibility which is the attribute 
of self-government. Thus, a necessary prerequisite for effective 
performance of the functions of territorial self-government is the 
existence of its own, and adequate, financial or property resources. 
(2003/07/09 - Pl. ÚSD 5/03: Territorial Self-Government Unit)
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constitutional design of local democracy
As mentioned earlier, the Czech constitution defines Czech democracy 
in a predominantly representative, parliamentary manner. This is, however, 
paralleled by constitutional foundations of subnational representative 
democracy as well as more direct forms of civic participation. 
It should be noted that the 1992 Constitution was predominantly designed 
by a government commission dominated by the ODS, which squarely 
favored a centralistic state without intermediary levels. The articles on local 
self-government that were ultimately included in the 1992 document were 
the result of a compromise between the ODS, its coalition members (more 
favorable to local government), and the opposition. The compromise led to a 
fairly vague and open-ended formulation,  and, as noted above, the regional 
level was not implemented before 1999, but the Czech Constitution does go 
some way in qualifying a fully centralistic as well as liberal-representative 
view of the Czech state. 
The Constitution arranges for representative democracy on the subnational 
level in article 101, which states that both municipalities and regions are 
administered by councils, which are “elected by secret ballot on the basis 
of universal, equal, and direct suffrage” (art. 102). The political status of 
subnational democracy is enhanced by the fact that, even if the turn-out rates 
for both the elections of regional and municipal councils are generally not 
very high, in particular the municipal institutions enjoy a very high level of 
political trust among the Czech citizens, much more so than those on the 
national level (Illner 2010: 519). 
Symbolic-substantive references to subnational democracy can be further 
found in the Czech Bill of Rights - the “Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and Basic Freedoms” -  which can be considered part of the constitutional 
constellation. The Charter invokes the Czech “ nations’ traditions of democracy 
and self-government”, and also refers to the fact that “[c]itizens have the right 
to participate in the administration of public affairs either directly or through 
the free election of their representatives” (art. 21(1)) (emphasis added). 
Turning to forms of direct democracy, the institutionalization of civic 
participation is rather weak in the Czech Republic. Thus, in a fairly stark 
contrast to the intensity of republican ideas of Charter 77 of the 1980s (see 
Renwick 2006; Blokker 2011), post-1989 Czech democracy appears to 
display the least extensive form of constitutional and legal institutionalization 
of forms of direct democracy - at least regarding the instrument of civic 
consultation through referenda - in the region. To be sure, elements of direct 
democracy are not prominent in the Czech Constitution. And while, as a 
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result of a compromise, the 1992 constitution does entail the formulation 
that “[a] constitutional law may stipulate the cases when the people exercise 
state power directly” (art. 2(2); emphasis added), to date no such law has 
been adopted, despite repeated attempts by pro-referendum groups (see for an 
extensive overview of such attempts, Adamova 2010).
But at closer look, while it is clear that political forces skeptical of referenda 
and direct democracy have so far prevailed, the issue is clearly not settled yet 
and continues to re-emerge in Czech political debate. For instance, in 2002, in 
the context of debates over the referendum on EU accession, a constitutional 
act for a general, national right to referendum was proposed, but was (once 
again) rejected by right-wing parties. Ultimately, an act on referendum was 
adopted that related only to EU membership. 
But while a constitutionally guaranteed right to the holding of national 
referenda is still absent, referenda on the local level have become much more 
consequential (on the regional level, referenda are not permitted). Admittedly, 
during the 1990s referenda were only used for questions of secession from 
existing municipal arrangements. And while the original legislation regarding 
local government – the 1992 Law on Local Elections and Referendums – 
notably stems from the Civic Forum period, no referendum of general import 
took place on its basis in the first decade of democratization. However, 
following the amendments of the law in 2004 and 2008, clearing a number 
of ambiguities and strengthening the position of referenda proposers,  local 
referenda have become a much more significant – and binding – civic 
instrument in Czech democracy, and are used for much wider purposes than 
before (see Smith 2011; Adamova 2010: 53-4).  
hungary
The Hungarian democratic state can be defined a “decentralized unitary” one 
– “[t]he Republic of Hungary is an independent, democratic constitutional state” 
(art. 2(1)) -  with a “strong and decentralized system of county governments” 
(Soos–Kakai 2010: 530). Local government is strongly entrenched in the 
Hungarian case, and enjoys a high level of autonomy in decision-making. Local 
democracy is mostly focused on representative, party-based democracy, while 
civic input and NGO participation are so far limited.
Below, I will describe the constitutional contours of both local self-
government and local democracy as it has emerged in Hungary between 1990 
and 2010. It will become clear that Hungary arguably has one of the strongest 
local government systems in the region, but equally that the democratic 
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potential of such a system is not used to the fullest extent. What is more, 
current constitutional turmoil might seriously undermine past achievements.
constitutional design of local government
In the constitutional changes of the early 1990s, local self-government 
enjoyed a high priority in that it was seen as an indispensable way of 
undermining the centralist institutions of “democratic centralism”. Thus, “the 
replacement of the council-based public administrative system with a sphere 
of independent local self-government was a key concern in administrative 
reform” (Balázs 1993: 76).  The amended Constitution of 1949 dedicates 
chapter IX to Local Governments, in which article 42 on the “Right to local 
government” now states: “Eligible voters of the communities, cities, the 
capital and its districts, and the counties have the right to local government. 
Local government refers to independent, democratic management of local 
affairs and the exercise of local public authority in the interests of the local 
population”. The main sub-national distinction is between the local level 
(villages, cities, capital districts, capital) and the county level. A regional 
level was added in 2000 to be able to attract EU Structural Funds, but its 
status so far is weak (Soós 2010: 113-14). In contrast, local governments of 
the municipal type, and to a lesser extent counties, are the entities with most 
political significance on the subnational level.
Democratic reforms towards decentralization involved mainly two stages. 
In 1990, the parliamentary Act No. LXV on Local Governments was adopted, 
which “established the legal foundation for the process of democratization 
and reform of the political system”.  The Act LXV is introduced as follows:
Following the progressive local government traditions of our 
country, as well as the basic requirements of the European Charter 
on local governments, Parliament recognizes and protects the 
rights of the local communities to self-government. Local self-
government makes it possible, that the local community of 
electors - directly, and/or through its selected local government 
- manage the public affairs of local interest independently and 
democratically. Supporting the self-organizing independence 
of local communities, Parliament assists the creation of the 
conditions necessary to self-government, it promotes the 
democratic decentralization of public authority (Act No. LXV).
Moreover, the Act No. LXIV on Local Elections was adopted, arranging for 
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local democracy to start functioning. In a second stage, in 1994, the existing 
local system was reformed by means of the Act on Local Governments (No. 
LXIII). These reforms included a call for broader constitutional guarantees of 
local government, steps towards more direct participation (the direct election 
of mayors), and the regulation of civic participation and publicity.  
These reforms have led some observers into saying that “[w]ithout doubt, 
the 1990 local government reform established one of the most liberal systems 
of local government in Europe” (Balazs 1993: 85).  Also others have argued 
that in 1990 legislation was adopted that established a “very high degree of 
autonomy for the lowest, local level of government”, while the constitution 
enshrined the right to self-government at local and county levels as a 
constitutional principle (Fowler 2001: 8). 
But while it has been acknowledged that this “rapid institutional reform 
was unique” (Fowler 2001),  it needs at the same time to be recognized that 
the extensive nature of the reforms have led to a relatively high level of 
fragmentation and dysfunctionality of local democracy and government. In 
this, the counterreaction to the hypercentralization of the communist regime 
has not necessarily led to adequate decentralized structures. That said, the 
significance of an institutional dimension of local government in Hungary – 
even if in need of amelioration – seems evident enough.
constitutional design of local democracy
Local democracy as a citizens’ right – in both indirect and direct ways 
– is entrenched in the Hungarian constitutional order, in that article 44 (1) 
stipulates that “[e]ligible voters exercise the right to local government through 
the representative body that they elect and by way of local referendum”.4 
In Act no. LXV, a similar idea is expressed in art. 1(4) as “[t]he local 
government may - through the elected local body of representatives, or with 
the decision of local plebiscite - undertake independently and voluntarily the 
solution of any local public affair, which is not referred by a legal rule to 
the jurisdiction of another organ”. And also in the Hungarian case, it can be 
argued that local democracy enjoys a relatively high standing in terms of 
4  In the new constitution, unilaterally adopted by Fidesz in April 2011, the representative 
dimension of local democracy is clearly articulated: “ [t]he members of the local representative 
body and the mayors are elected by the citizens on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, with 
direct and secret ballot, at elections articulating the free will of the people in a manner defined 
by super majority law” (art. 35(1)). The instrument of local referendum is mentioned once in 
the draft text, but not in the section on local government, and without further stipulation.
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civic political trust. Local governments (with the institutions of the president 
and the constitutional court) tend to score significantly higher than both the 
parliament and the government (Soós and Kákai 2010: 541).
Institutions of direct democracy on the local level are fairly well-entrenched 
in the Hungarian case. In general, “demands for referendums were part of the 
movement for democracy” and since the transition, “no political party has 
denied that at least certain forms of direct democracy should be part of the 
Hungarian constitutional and political order”, Dezsõ and Bragyova 2001: 63). 
In the late 1980s, the reaction of the Communist party to the opposition’s 
demand for referenda resulted in Act XVII, adopted unilaterally in June 1989. 
This legal act was the basis for referenda and popular initiatives until 1997, 
when it was renewed and partially replaced by constitutional articles. The 
earlier act – according to András Sajó a “very poorly drafted document” (2006) 
- was widely contested because of various lacuna, not least in procedural 
terms. What is more, there was a strong suspicion of its unconstitutionality. 
In 1997, a new set of rules was constitutionalized through a constitutional 
amendment (Act C of 1997 on Electoral Procedure), and can be regarded 
as at least partially the outcome of initiatives related to the democratization 
movement of the 1980s. Even if the “scope and conditions of referenda were 
gradually restricted since 1989”, the amendment of the constitution enhanced 
the status of direct democracy considerably (i.e. Chapter XV on local 
referendums and Chapter XVI on local initiative). The constitutional status 
of referenda was reiterated by a ruling of the Constitutional Court in which it 
argued that  the “institution of referendum is closely related to the provisions of 
the Constitution. Referendum, as typical form of direct democracy, is related 
to the sovereignty of the people, and, the practice of the Court interprets 
the right to referendum as political fundamental right” (website Hungarian 
Constitutional Court; decision 52/1997; emphasis added).
While in general the Hungarian democratic system is a representative one, the 
constitutionalization of instruments of direct democracy has created a tension 
between direct democracy and the predominantly liberal, representative idea as 
constitutional principles. To some extent, “direct democratic institutions already 
have a foothold in Hungarian constitutional thought” (Dezsö and Bragyova 
2007: 82, even if the institutions are still not sufficiently well-defined.5  
5  Schiller classifies Hungary’s procedures of local direct democracy as of ‘medium’ quality, 
together with the Czech Republic and a majority of the German states (Schiller 2011: 19). 
Schiller further argues that in a comparative context, Hungary, at least in contrast to Belgium, 
Luxemburg, and Spain, displays “substantial rates of activity” of local direct democracy (2011: 
22).
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poland
Also the Polish constitutional state is defined as a unitary and centralized 
state, even if allowing for subnational government on the regional and local 
levels. In other words,  while, as expressed in article 3 of the 1997 Constitution, 
Poland has without a doubt a unitary system, its constitutional order allows 
for  “relatively strong local autonomy” and tendencies towards strengthening 
regionalization are visible (Swianiewicz 2010: 482). The latter becomes 
already clear from the preamble – “… [h]ereby establish this Constitution 
of the Republic of Poland as the basic law for the State, based on respect for 
freedom and justice, cooperation between the public powers, social dialogue 
as well as on the principle of aiding in the strengthening the powers of citizens 
and their communities” (emphasis added).
Below, I will briefly describe the constitutional contours of both local self-
government and local democracy as it has emerged in particular in the Polish 
Constitution of 1997, as well as in the process of regionalization of the last 
few years of the 1990s.
constitutional design of local government
In the Polish case, local self-government was a prominent focus in the 
constitution-making process, and has been amply arranged for in the 1997 
Constitution. The process of decentralization already started in the early 
1990s, and had in many ways been prepared by the political struggle of the 
Solidarność trade union for decentralized government (cf. Benzler 1994; also 
Blokker 2011). The Local Government Act of 1990 provided the fundamental 
legal underpinnings of the right to self-governance of local authorities. In 
addition, almost all of Solidarność’s demands for territorial self-government 
were enshrined in the articles 43-47 of the amended 1952 constitution, while 
these were later re-confirmed in the so-called Small Constitution of 1992. 
The 1997 constitution has often been criticized of being rather unspecific 
with regard to notions of local self-government and decentralization, but it 
can at the same time be argued that the dimension of local self-government 
is strongly anchored in the text. As noted above, the symbolic-substantive 
dimension of self-government and subsidiarity is reflected in the preamble, 
indicating their status as foundational-constitutional values. The constitutional 
text itself introduces local self-government as early as article 15 - “[t]he 
territorial system of the Republic of Poland shall ensure the decentralization 
of public power” (1) - and 16  -“[t]he inhabitants of the units of basic territorial 
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division shall form a self-governing community in accordance with law”(1) 
- and “[l]ocal self-government shall participate in the exercise of public 
power. The substantial part of public duties which local self-government is 
empowered to discharge by statute shall be done in its own name and under its 
own responsibility” (2). The constitution arranges for local self-government 
in a detailed way in chapter VII. It should be noted (cf. Swianiewicz 2010: 
484), however, that only the local, municipal level (gmina) is arranged for in 
the constitution (art. 164(1)), while the other, regional and county, levels are to 
be arranged for by statute (164(2)). In substantive-symbolic terms therefore, 
local self-governance at the municipal level is prioritized. 
The process of decentralization and the creation of local self-government 
has arguably been a success in Poland, and is one of the most effective – 
even if continuously contested – reforms in the region (contestation regards in 
particular the status of the subnational levels other than that of municipalities). 
The attention for local self-government and civic participation can be clearly 
related to the dissident legacy of Solidarność,  even if the latter’s original idea 
of a “self-governing republic” has never been realized in any extensive way. 
On the one hand, it can then be argued that “local self-government in Poland 
found a permanent place within the post-transformation political landscape”, 
not least through its constitutionalization, but at the same time, it can be said 
that there are clear tendencies at recentralization and state disregard for local 
autonomy (Regulska 2009). What is significant, though, is that tensions and 
contestations over the desirable form of local self-government, and appropriate 
relations between the centre and periphery continue to exist, indicating 
the unsettled nature of local democracy and the continuous relevance and 
discursive force of the notion of self-government.
constitutional design of local democracy
Local government is underpinned by both representative and direct forms 
of democracy in Poland: “[e]lections to constitutive organs shall be universal, 
direct, equal and shall be conducted by secret ballot. The principles and 
procedures for submitting candidates and for the conduct of elections, as well 
as the requirements for the validity of elections, shall be specified by statute 
“(169(2)), and “[m]embers of a self-governing community may decide, by 
means of a referendum, matters concerning their community, including the 
dismissal of an organ of local government established by direct election. 
The principles of and procedures for conducting a local referendum shall 
be specified by statute” (170). Local elections are arranged for by the 1998 
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Local Election Law. Also in the Polish case, turnout for local elections tends 
to be relatively low (it has never been higher than 50 percent since 1990, 
see Swianiewicz 2010: 497), but public opinion polls show consistently 
higher civic trust towards local institutions than towards central political 
institutions. 
In terms of direct democracy as a dimension of post-1989 Polish local 
democracy, it is clear that it has become a “common element of democratic 
decision-making” (Přibáň & Sadurski 2006: 218; cf. Piasecki 2011: 136). 
Dimensions of participatory democracy – in particular through the form of 
referenda – have taken on a certain significance in the Polish democratic 
architecture in their own right, and already from the late 1980s onwards (see 
Piasecki 2011).
The institutionalization of instruments of direct democracy started early on 
in the Polish transformation. Two constitutional amendments in late 1989 and 
early 1990 introduced a change of the 1952 constitution so that sovereignty 
was now vested in the nation, and could be exercised in a representative as 
well as a direct way. The Local Government Act of 1990 included the option 
of popular vote, next to that of regular elections, and identified three types 
of referenda: mandatory (recall), mandatory (self-taxation), and facultative 
(matters of importance to the commune (Piasecki 2011: 126-7). The Local 
Referendum Act of 1991 further stipulated the implementation of referenda.
Instruments of direct democracy were also articulated forcefully in most 
constitutional drafts proposed throughout the early 1990s,  and in the newly 
adopted Constitution in 1997 even gained somewhat in importance. The 
Polish constitution invokes a notion of direct civic participation as early 
as in article 4(2), and the strengthening of citizens power is alluded to in 
the preamble. The 1997 constitution codifies the citizens’ right to direct 
participation through referenda in constitutional matters, national referenda 
regarding ordinary legislation, and referenda on the local level. Article 170 
stipulates that “[m]embers of a self-governing community may decide, by 
means of a referendum, matters concerning their community, including the 
dismissal of an organ of local self-government established by direct election. 
The principles of and procedures for conducting a local referendum shall be 
specified by statute”.
It seems fair to argue that the 1997 Constitution, “unlike all its predecessors, 
contains a relatively wide range of provisions concerning direct democracy”, 
which is a “fact worth stressing, especially as such solutions are rare in Polish 
history” (Szmyt 1999: 128-129). This interpretation is confirmed by the legal 
scholar Ewa Popławska, who has argued that the “increasing value of direct 
democracy is reflected in its extended forms, in particular in the extension 
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of the scope of facultative application of a referendum to include matters of 
fundamental importance to the state” (Popławska 1999: 189). As for instance 
argued by a current judge of the Constitutional Court, Stanisław Biernat, the 
referendum instrument does have particular significance on the local level 
(Biernat 2005). This observation is corroborated by the sociologist Paweł 
Swianiewicz, who in the early 2000s observed some positive trends in terms 
of more frequent and widespread use of local referenda, and a higher success 
rate (Swianiewicz 2001). 
conclusions
Following, among others, Bailey and Elliott, I have argued that a “virtuous 
circle” of subnational government and democracy mutually enforcing each 
other is only likely to come about in a constitutional context of sufficiently 
decentralized and autonomized local self-government with a variety of 
democratic channels, and the unambiguous endorsement of constitutionalized 
subnational self-government by relevant political and legal actors. The concise 
review of the relevant foundational legal structures as have been adopted in 
the cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland since 1989 shows 
that, on the one hand, significant steps towards subnational self-government 
have clearly been made, but also that, on the other, subnational equilibria 
and state-local relations are in some instances fragile, and do not always 
enjoy sufficient legal guarantees or the protection of clear-cut constitutional 
principles. Furthermore, distinct problems with decentralization6 await further 
steps of reform.
In the Czech Republic, both the local and the regional level are part of the 
constitutional make-up. The 1992 Constitution indicates both levels as basic 
and higher units of territorial government respectively. The regional level 
was, however, only implemented in the later 1990s, after protracted political 
conflict over its necessity, and following sharp critique by the EU on the lack 
of an adequate regional administrative structure. The belated implementation 
of the regional level has, according to some observers, resulted in a lower 
level of civic trust in regional institutions and less political prominence. 
This is exacerbated by a limited autonomy in financial matters as well as the 
6  These include far-going municipal fragmentation in the Czech Republic and Hungary; the 
clarification of relations between the various subnational levels and the centre, as well as 
organizational clarity regarding prerogatives and duties; the predominance of national political 
parties on the local level; and  limited civic participation.
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continued existence of regional structures directly administered by the state 
(Illner 2010: 522-3). Regarding local and regional democracy, democratic 
institutions and mechanisms are clearly available on the subnational level. 
The local level is, however, the only level on which direct democracy is 
provided for in terms of referenda, an instrument that is increasingly put to 
use (Smith 2011). 
In Hungary7, the constitution identifies various levels of subnational self-
government, but the local, municipal (and county) levels are clearly the ones 
that are more significant, not least because of the stipulation of a relatively 
wide set of responsibilities and a relatively high level in the independence of 
finance (Soos–Kákai 2010: 532). Also in Hungary, local, municipal-level self-
government has enjoyed priority throughout the transformation period. As 
Soós has argued, ‘[l]egally speaking, the rights of local governments are well 
protected’ (2010: 125). The middle-tier (including that of counties) has, in this, 
become somewhat more important only later on. In terms of local democracy, 
representative mechanisms are well-established while direct forms (referenda 
as well as a citizens’ initiative) have only been constitutionally enshrined in 
1997, while referenda have been endorsed by the Constitutional Court as a 
“fundamental political right”. Despite such legal safeguards, however, local 
democratic politics is – according to some observers – not of high quality, 
even if participation through elections is increasing (Soós–Kákai 2010: 549). 
In Poland, the constitution prioritizes both subnational government and 
democracy on the local, municipal level. Only the latter has constitutional 
status (as the “basic unit of local government”), although its status is subject to 
political conflict and attempts at recentralization by the central state (Regulska 
2009). Since 1998, county and regional levels have been added to the subnational 
picture, but regional self-government is paralleled by regional decentralized state 
institutions. Despite their limited functions and financial autonomy, regions do 
seem to have created a “new political dynamism” and are slowly becoming more 
robust, according to some observers (Swianiewicz 2010: 501).
The aforementioned political conflict over decentralization tends to 
undermine subnational forms of democracy in Poland (cf. Regulska 2009). 
Such conflict negatively influences the potential of local self-government, but 
also that of local democracy and civic participation. While local democracy is 
well-entrenched in both its representative and direct (local referenda) forms, 
the parameters for local autonomy seem not always unambiguously respected 
by the central state institutions, political parties, as well as local elites, and 
7  The full impact of current constitutional turmoil on subnational self-government will 
unfortunately have to await the evolvement of events.
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a functional, rather than a democratic-participatory interpretation of local 
self-government seems to prevail so far (Swianiewicz 2010: 484). At the 
same time, civil society institutions are mostly not strong enough to provide 
sufficient counterthrust. 
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